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 The Central Intelligence Agency — No other department within the U.S. 
government structure has the same element of controversy that surrounds the CIA. 
As a bureaucracy created to conduct covert operations with minimal government 
oversight and no transparency, the agency seems the very antithesis of democratic 
values. Critics of the agency have voiced their opposition for decades, and the idea of 
agency reform is certainly not new. However, after the CIA’s failure to predict and 
prevent the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and its subsequent “enhanced 
interrogation” techniques against suspected terrorists, such criticism has only 
increased. First, how could the CIA — an agency responsible for collecting 
intelligence on threats against the U.S. — miss a major attack on U.S. soil? Second, 
regarding “enhanced interrogation,” are such techniques even legal?  
 Those are only two of the many questions surrounding the CIA in recent 
years. Essentially, it appears that the CIA cannot perform its job and when it does 
attempt to carry out its duties, uses methods that are suspect at best. This kind of 
criticism is a relatively new phenomenon, as I will discuss in greater detail in the 
following sections. During the height of the Cold War, when the CIA had a defined 
mission, it performed well. The agency had relevance within the intelligence 
community. Although the CIA certainly had its share of missteps, it did its job. In the 
post-Cold War world, this has not been the case. Without a clear mission, the CIA has 
— to put it simply — lost its way, opening itself to attacks and questions like the 
examples I gave above. I argue that the rise of the Islamic extremist threat, however, 
has given the CIA the opportunity to redesign itself, and I will present a plan for such 
redesign. 
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Before I can detail my recommendations, however, I find it necessary to give 
an overview of the history of the CIA. I divide this history into two sections — before 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and after. In the former, I will illustrate how the CIA 
was at its best during the Cold War before showing how the agency’s mission 
became irrelevant after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the end of the Cold 
War left the CIA with neither a clear mission nor a specific enemy. As a result, the 
agency has floundered and failed in recent years. In the second section, I will discuss 
how 9/11 has given the agency the opportunity to make itself relevant within the 
intelligence community once more. 
After giving an overview of the agency’s history, I will turn to my plan for 
reform. In this thesis, I will present a plan designed to revitalize the CIA. The plan 
calls for the CIA to focus exclusively on Islamic terrorism, which I contend is the 
number one threat to American security today. My plan also calls for change in the 
way the CIA does business, and I will detail specific reforms the agency must adopt 
in order to effectively fight Islamic terrorism. In the end, I believe my proposal 
represents a way forward for a vital yet troubled agency. 
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The CIA Before 9/11 
In this section, I will discuss the history of the CIA, focusing particularly on its 
efforts against the Soviet Union during the Cold War followed by a description of 
how the CIA essentially lost its way during the 1990s after the fall of communism. In 
describing the history and the agency’s role, I will focus heavily on works by Scott 
Monje and Athan Theoharis with some reference to John Diamond and Melissa 
Boyle Mahle. 
The Origins of the CIA 
The U.S. government had a long history of intelligence collecting even before 
the establishment of the CIA in 1947. For instance, the military had created its own 
intelligence-gathering agencies beginning with the Office of Naval Intelligence in 
1882. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also had some experience in 
intelligence gathering when it developed the Special Intelligence Service branch to 
work in Latin American in the 1930s.1 It was not until World War II, however, that 
the U.S. government felt the need to create a full-time civilian intelligence agency.  
The U.S. government began intercepting communications from the Soviet 
Union, Japan, Germany and other Axis-aligned states even prior to official U.S. 
involvement in the war.2 After the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, 
President Franklin Roosevelt and his successors recognized the need 
to anticipate the hostile actions of powerful states or movements that 
had the intent and capability whether to upset the balance of power, 
                                                        
1 Richard Immerman, “A Brief History of the CIA,” in The Central Intelligence Agency : 
security under scrutiny, ed: Athan Theoharis (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
2006), 4 
 
2 Athan Theoharis, “Introduction,” in The Central Intelligence Agency : security under 
scrutiny, ed: Athan Theoharis (Westport, Connecticut.: Greenwood Press, 2006), xvii 
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to attack the United States, or to undermine support for U.S. policies 
and/or U.S. investments and commercial opportunities.”3 For this 
reason, Roosevelt signed a presidential military order on June 12, 
1942 establishing the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to analyze 
collected intelligence as well as conduct some operations as directed 
by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.4  
 
 Throughout the United States’ involvement in the war, the OSS expanded 
rapidly under director William “Wild Bill” Donovan, conducting espionage, sabotage, 
propaganda, code-breaking and intelligence analysis. After Roosevelt’s death and 
then the end of war in 1945, President Harry Truman ordered the immediate 
dissolution of the OSS. The existence of such an agency seemed abnormal in the 
history of U.S. government, and Truman feared Donovan’s actions as director 
bordered on that of a police state.5 After abolishing the OSS, Truman transferred 
most of the organization’s duties to the Departments of War and State.6 The 
Strategic Services Unit under the War Department would conduct the operations 
end of things while the State Department’s Interim Research and Intelligence 
Service would handle the analysis.7  
Although Truman was uncomfortable with the idea of a civilian intelligence 
agency, he recognized the need for a similar organization that could protect the 
United States from the looming Soviet threat. However, he hoped that such 
                                                        
3 Theoharis, “Introduction,” xviii 
4 Scott C. Monje, The Central Intelligence Agency: A Documentary History (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2008), 1 
5 Immerman, “A Brief History of the CIA,” 4 
6 Monje, 3 
7 Immerman “A Brief History of the CIA,” 4 
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protection could come from a centralized agency within the armed forces.8 Thus, in 
January 1946 he created the Central Intelligence Group, which would coordinate 
intelligence operations carried out under the War Department. Caught between the 
State and War departments’ bureaucracies and unable to carry out its own 
operations, this group only lasted 20 months before Truman ordered the creation of 
an independent intelligence organization — the CIA.9 
 With the passage of the National Security Act on 26 July 1947, Congress 
created the CIA.10 Title I, Section 102 of the act described the agency’s charter, 
detailing how the CIA would be created as well as its autonomy from the armed 
forces. In addition, the act lists the five duties of the agency: 
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such 
intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as 
relate to national security; 
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the 
coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and 
agencies of the Government as relate to the national security; 
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, 
and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within 
the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: 
Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-
enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, 
That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall 
continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental 
intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central 
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and 
methods from unauthorized disclosure; 
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such 
additional services of common concern as the National Security Council 
determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally; 
                                                        
8 Monje, 3 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence 
affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from 
time to time direct.11 
 As seen in note (3), Truman tried to alleviate fears that this kind of 
organization would result in the development of a police state. In addition, he tried 
to address bureaucratic concerns by allowing existing agencies to continue their 
own operations for their own purposes. 
Fighting Soviets and Communism 
Almost from its creation, the CIA focused specifically on collecting 
intelligence on and conducting operations against the Soviet Union. Just a year after 
Congress passed the National Security Act, the United States faced two events that 
intensified the Cold War: the Soviet’s blockade in Berlin and the Communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia. Given that the young organization failed to predict either of these 
events, Truman and his national security advisors recommended “a comprehensive 
review of the fledgling CIA.”12 What followed in June 1949 was the Central 
Intelligence Act, which clearly defined the CIA’s mission and gave it relevance in the 
post-World War II global order. 
 By 1946, the Truman administration “concluded that the United States 
confronted a different kind of war that required a different kind of thinking. 
Americans could not afford to ‘play fair’ because the communists would not.”13 It 
was not that U.S. officials expected another major war on par with World War II. 
Instead, they feared the Soviets would resort to propaganda, exploiting political 
unrest and economic instability in order to further their own agenda and win more 
                                                        
11 Ibid., 4 
12 Immerman, “A Brief History of the CIA,” 13 
13 Ibid., 15 
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Communist allies across the globe. In 1948, the Truman administration addressed 
these fears with the National Security Council directive 10/2, which made the CIA 
responsible for conducting covert operations in the name of U.S. security.14 
However, this directive not only failed to allocate funds to the CIA, it also essentially 
divided leadership of the CIA between the State Department and the Defense 
Department.15 In the light of the two events in 1948 mentioned previously, the 
Truman administration rectified these problems with the Central Intelligence Act. 
Now, the CIA not only had the funds necessary to conduct operations, it would also 
receive funds allocated to other agencies (thus, concealing the sensitive nature of 
the CIA’s budget.)16 In addition, the CIA was given the authority to fulfill its duties 
without oversight from the State and Defense Departments. Essentially, the act “was 
everything that the ‘intelligence professionals’ wanted it to be.”17 
 So, now that the CIA had the resources and authority to wage a secret war on 
the Soviet Union, how did they carry through on this mission?  For the most part, the 
CIA relied heavily on technological innovations. Since the Soviet Union and its 
Communist states were “closed societies,” restricting the movement of their people, 
the CIA found it difficult to recruit spies within the USSR (unless those potential 
spies volunteered, that is).18 Thus, in order to collect intelligence, the CIA began to 
                                                        
14 Monje, 9 
15 Immerman, “A Brief History of the CIA,” 17 
16 Monje, 10 
17 Immerman, “A Brief History of the CIA,” 14 
18 John Prados, “A World of Secrets: Intelligence and Counterintelligence,” in The 
Central Intelligence Agency : security under scrutiny, ed: Athan Theoharis (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006), 127 
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invest heavily in its technological capabilities. One of the most successful operations 
in collecting such intelligence was the CIA’s CORONA. 
 Launched in 1958, CORONA was a satellite surveillance program. The 
program involved different satellite lines with some intended for broad area 
coverage and others for more detailed photography. In addition, the satellites were 
equipped with “infrared cameras for night photography, shadow elimination, and 
other applications.”19 The project also involved radar satellites that could observe 
Soviet activities through cloud cover and across the sea. Finally, the CIA also worked 
to create a “stealth” satellite that could monitor Soviet activities while remaining 
unobservable from the ground.20 
 The CIA experienced its first success with the project in August 1962 when it 
successfully launched the satellite Discoverer XIV. During its flight, the satellite 
managed to complete seven passes across the Soviet Union, providing the CIA with 
“more photographic coverage of the Soviet Union than all previous U-2 missions.”21  
The project continued successfully over the next decade as satellites tied 
with the CORONA operation continued to collect pictures of the Soviet Union and 
other areas of interest, continually improving picture quality. While the project 
could not always give exact numbers regarding Soviet military buildup, “the 
intelligence that CORONA and its successor satellite programs provided about Soviet 
missile capabilities…and much more was invaluable, frequently providing the 
                                                        
19 Ibid., 131. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Immerman, “A Brief History of the CIA,” 33. 
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foundation for National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National 
Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs).”22 
Such technological capabilities helped the CIA predict the presence of 
Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) several months before the Cuban Missile 
Crisis and also enabled the agency to provide the Kennedy administration the 
intelligence needed to diffuse the crisis. Although the CIA had been slow to detect 
the exact weapons capabilities the Soviets had in Cuba, the agency had predicted the 
possibility of such a crisis in August, presenting the information twice to President 
Kennedy and his advisors that month.23 Thus, in early October, the CIA received 
permission to conduct U-2 surveillance photography, detecting the presence of 
MRBMs in Cuba. Throughout the thirteen days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the CIA 
continued to conduct surveillance through U-2 missions and eavesdropping 
operations, providing “a steady stream of intelligence on the number and likely 
operational state of the missile sites, on Soviet and Warsaw Pact military 
preparations, and on the progress made by Soviet ships headed toward the 
quarantine line.”24 With this intelligence, the Kennedy administration had the 
information necessary to prepare a response as well as disprove Soviet assertions of 
innocence in the UN Security Council meeting. While Kennedy’s judgment along 
with Soviet concessions and backchannel exchanges between a KGB agent and a U.S. 
news media correspondent were what diffused the crisis, “The early detection of the 
sites by the CIA, nevertheless, provided the administration with a critical window to 
                                                        
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 38 
24 Ibid., 39 
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frame its response, and the subsequent intelligence it provided militated against a 
precipitate employment of U.S. force.”25 
  The CORONA project and successful prediction and diffusion of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis are only two examples of the CIA’s work during the Cold War. With a 
defined mission to collect intelligence on and conduct operations against the Soviet 
Union, the CIA rapidly developed the technological capabilities needed to perform 
its duties.  
A “Rogue Agency” and its Missteps 
 The CIA, since its inception, has been plagued with scandals. To some extent, 
such continuous scandal is the natural byproduct of the covert operations field. The 
agency, in order to be effective, needs to conduct many of its operations out of the 
public eye, occasionally reporting only to the White House. As John Diamond writes, 
“the risks inherent in the business of intelligence make it a bureaucratic endeavor 
particularly prone to failure.”26 For the CIA, the 1970s seemed filled with such 
failures with the agency’s role in Watergate, the Frank Church investigations and the 
Otis Pike committee accusations. Indeed, the controversies of the 1970s highlighted 
the dangers of such a covert organization in a democracy. 
 In June 1972, Washington city police arrested five burglars breaking into the 
Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate office complex 
carrying one hundred dollar bills and advanced surveillance equipment. During 
their arraignment, one of the defendants told the judge that he was a former CIA-
                                                        
25 Ibid 
26 John Diamond, The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of 
the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq (California: Stanford University Press, 2008), 6 
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employee and currently worked for Nixon’s reelection committee.27 Over the next 
year, investigations of a possible CIA cover-up of the burglary revealed that Nixon 
had pressured the CIA to stop the FBI from continuing its investigation of the 
burglary. If the truth behind Watergate emerged, Nixon said, “it’s going to make the 
CIA look bad, it’s going to make (CIA veteran E. Edward) Hunt look bad, and it’s 
likely to blow the whole Bay of Pigs, which we think would be very unfortunate for 
the CIA.”28 The five men were indicted for burglary, conspiracy, and illegal 
wiretapping. Nixon, after the release of the tapes, resigned before he could face 
impeachment. For the agency, the Watergate scandal led to “the most extensive 
investigations of CIA activities in history.”29 
 To further investigate the CIA post-Watergate, Democrat Frank Church led a 
special Senate panel in 1975 that uncovered CIA assassination plots against Fidel 
Castro of Cuba, Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican 
Republic.30 The Church committee also uncovered Operation CHAOS, a domestic 
mail-opening program that resulted in files on 7,200 American citizens. In addition, 
the White House turned over reports confirming that not only did the CIA monitor 
domestic activities but it also tested various drugs on unsuspecting Americans.31 
                                                        
27 Kathryn Olmsted “Lapdog or Rogue Elephant? CIA Controversies from 1947 to 
2004” in The Central Intelligence Agency : security under scrutiny, ed: Athan 
Theoharis (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006), 200 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 203 
30 Ibid., 204 
31 Immerman, “A Brief History,” 51 
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Given such discoveries, Church declared that the agency was a “rogue elephant on a 
rampage.”32  
 That same year, a special committee in the House of Representatives also 
investigated charges of CIA misconduct. Using the same evidence, the Pike 
committee reached a different conclusion than the Church committee. While Church 
had accused the CIA of acting rogue, the House committee — chaired by Democrat 
Otis Pike — accused the agency of falling victim to “an imperial presidency.”33 In its 
final report, the committee concluded that “All evidence in hand suggests that the 
CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive to the instructions of 
the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.”34 As a 
result of such investigations, both the Senate and the House created oversight 
committees.35  
“Unleashing” the CIA  
If the 1970s could be characterized as a decade of investigation and more 
oversight, the 1980s involved a complete reversal once President Ronald Reagan 
took office. Reagan was willing to excuse CIA abuses of authority (he had served on 
the Rockefeller Commission in 1975 to investigate the “family jewels” — a report on 
the CIA’s illegal activities) but was unwilling to excuse what he considered the CIA’s 
greatest flaw — underestimating the power and capabilities of the Soviet Union.36 
Thus, in his first year, Reagan issued Executive Order 12333, “which allowed some 
                                                        
32 Olmsted, “Lapdog or Rogue Elephant?”, 205 
33 Ibid., 206 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 208 
36 Immerman, “A Brief History of the CIA,” 57 
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CIA domestic spying, surveillance of Americans abroad, and some covert operations 
in the United States.”37 He also appointed William Casey as the new director. Reagan 
believed that Casey, an OSS veteran, “appreciated that the United States was in 
danger and was willing to take risks to secure the national interest.”38 
Floundering and Failing in the 1990s 
If the CIA’s mission was to fight the Soviet Union, then the collapse of the 
Communist threat left the agency without a clear agenda. Indeed, between the end 
of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the CIA lacked a 
clear goal. Furthermore, the CIA was plagued by what many labeled as “intelligence 
failures” as the agency either failed (or the White House or Congress found it 
convenient to pin the blame of various controversies on the agency).39 “These 
controversies — allegations that the CIA missed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
CIA’s performance before and during the Persian Gulf War, the Aldrich Ames spy 
scandal, the belated realization of the al-Qaeda threat, battles over the capabilities of 
‘rogue state’ adversaries…” occurred at a time of transition both for the nation and 
the CIA.40 The United States had to find a way to navigate international relations in a 
post-Cold War world, and the CIA struggled to find its purpose. Authors have 
devoted entire books to this one decade. For this reason, I shall focus less on the 
details of the aforementioned crises and instead focus on showing the pattern of 
failure, or perceived failures, that plagued the agency after the collapse of its defined 
enemy of four decades. 
                                                        
37 Olmsted, “Lapdog or Rogue Elephant?” 208 
38 Immerman, “A Brief History of the CIA,” 57 
39 Diamond, The CIA and the Culture of Failure, 4. 
40 Ibid. 
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 “The dynamics of intelligence failure changed with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union because the geopolitical situation changed.”41 With post-Cold War 
downsizing, the agency, in particular, found its own capabilities shrinking rapidly as 
its budget was cut dramatically.42 During the Cold War, politicians on both sides of 
the aisle agreed that the Soviet Union posed a threat to U.S. security and that threat 
needed elimination. After the Cold War, however, some Americans began to debate 
whether or not the agency was still necessary. In fact, some politicians were calling 
for a complete dissolution of the agency. Not only had the CIA outlived its purpose, 
they claimed, it also failed to fulfill its mission — stay informed on all matters 
surrounding the Soviet Union so that U.S. policy makers had the necessary 
information to make sound decisions for U.S. security policy. “Failure to foresee the 
Soviet collapse stood as a fundamental failure of intelligence collection and analysis, 
a failure that went to the core of the CIA’s mission.”43 Thus, in 1991, New York 
Senator Daniel Moynihan began suggesting that the CIA’s functions be folded into 
the State Department.44 In fact, in 1995, he sponsored the Abolition of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act. His legislation, however, won only a few supporters.45 
While Moynihan’s act never passed in the Senate, it represented a dramatic shift in 
how the rest of the U.S. government viewed the CIA. In a unipolar world, without a 
clear-cut enemy like the Soviet Union, it was suddenly politically feasible to call for a 
                                                        
41 Ibid., 7 
42 Ibid., 6 
43 Ibid., 24 
44 Immerman, 64 
45 Ibid. 
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complete elimination of the agency charged with collecting and analyzing foreign 
intelligence. 
 The end of the Cold War also changed agency morale. While many CIA 
employees celebrated the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, they did not know to find 
their footing in a post-Cold War world. As Mahle, a former CIA operative, writes that 
the agency began to drift without its former mission. “Yet, we did not seem to be in 
any hurry to reorient ourselves to meet new challenges in the new unipolar world,” 
she says.46 Instead, the CIA continued to focus on the Soviet Union — the breakup of 
the USSR, recruitment of former Soviet intelligence officers, and continuing to focus 
on “proxy wars” despite a lack of Soviet participation.47 
  Under the leadership of Robert Gates, the agency began to finally turn away 
from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. For example, the agency provided vital 
intelligence on Iraqi capabilities after the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War.48 In 
addition, the agency began to monitor Sudan “as a state sponsor of a new kind of 
international terrorism” and aided the U.S. military when it intervened in the 
Balkans and Africa.49 Essentially, “The Agency tried to do everything in order to 
please all consumers rather than refocus of redefine a strategic mission.”50 As a 
result, the agency floundered through the decade, dispersing its reduced resources 
among many, varied missions.  
 
                                                        
46 Melissa Boyle Mahle, Denial and Deception: An Insider’s View of the CIA from Iran-
Contra to 9/11 (New York: Nation Books, 2004), 57 
47 Diamond, 6 
48 Ibid., 116-117 
49 Mahle, 103 
50 Ibid. 
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The CIA After 9/11 
In this section, I will discuss how the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, clearly defined a threat — Islamic terrorism — for the CIA to target. If the CIA 
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worked best when faced with a clear mission (as discussed in Section II), then 9/11 
gave the agency the change to prove its relevance once more. Despite this 
opportunity, the CIA continued to flounder. In describing the CIA’s immediate 
response to 9/11 and its handling of the war in Afghanistan, I will rely heavily on 
first-hand accounts from former CIA director George Tenet and former CIA 
operative Gary C. Schroen. I will then turn to the 9/11 Commission Report and how 
the CIA reforms, thus far, have failed to make the agency a truly relevant and 
effective organization. 
The Invasion of Afghanistan 
 After nineteen al-Qaeda terrorist hijacked four U.S. planes, destroying the 
World Trade Center and damaging the Pentagon in the process, the CIA — along 
with the rest of the U.S. government — acted quickly to respond to this attack. At the 
agency, CIA officials felt they “had good reason to believe that more attacks might 
coming in the hours or days ahead and that 9/11 was just the opening salvo of a 
multi-pronged assault on the American mainland.”51 For this reason, the CIA 
immediately began drafting a response that would not only prevent further attacks 
but also eradicate al-Qaeda altogether. By September 13, agency officials presented 
to President George Bush and the War Cabinet a plan to invade Afghanistan.52 The 
early plan involved the deployment of a CIA paramilitary team that would work 
with Taliban opposition forces and prepare the ground for the invasion of U.S. 
Special Forces. At this point, the plan involved not only a strike against al-Qaeda but 
                                                        
51 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 2007), xix 
52 Ibid., 175 
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the Taliban as well. According to Tenet and CIA Counterterrorist Center Chief Cofer 
Black, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were virtually inseparable. Thus, any plan to 
destroy the terrorist organization must include the destruction of the Taliban unless 
the latter chose to separate itself from al-Qaeda (which Tenet and other CIA officials 
believed was unlikely).53 
 The next day, the CIA continued refining its plan for Afghanistan. While the 
perimeters of the plan within Afghanistan remained the same, the CIA began 
broadening its scope, making Afghanistan “only the opening act of a comprehensive 
strategy for combating international terrorism.”54 On September 15, Tenet, Black 
and other agency officials took the plan — “Destroying International Terrorism” — 
to Camp David. First, the CIA would close off Afghanistan by engaging directly the 
Iranians, Turks, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Pakistanis.55 The agency would further isolate 
the Taliban by providing assistance to the Northern Alliance — various tribes that 
were united against the Taliban — as well as to southern Pashtun leaders, including 
any Taliban leaders who wanted to see Mullah Omar removed from power.56 Next, 
the agency would look to regional allies to “create a cadre of officers who could 
blend seamlessly into environments where it would be difficult for (Americans) top 
operate on (their) own.”57 Finally, the CIA would also look to its allies across the 
globe to pursue and capture al-Qaeda terrorists in every country in the world. 
                                                        
53 Ibid., 175 
54 Ibid., 176 
55 Ibid., 177 
56 Ibid., 177 
57 Ibid., 177-178 
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Essentially, the CIA was prepared to take on an entirely new mission that would 
define its role for the foreseeable future. 
 Bush, much like Reagan in the 1980s, unleashed the CIA, directing “the full 
resources of (American) intelligence and law enforcement communities to find 
those responsible (for 9/11) and bring them to justice.”58 Tenet had asked for 
“broad operational authority,” and Bush granted the agency the right to use as many 
authorities as it needed to successfully complete this mission.59 Thus, by September 
27, just sixteen days after 9/11, the CIA had inserted its first covert teams into 
Afghanistan.60 
 The Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team (NALT) — codenamed 
JAWBREAKER — was the first such team the CIA sent to the nation. Consisting of 
seven members, the team had orders to not only prepare the way for the U.S. 
military by reaching out to the Northern Alliance but also “to exert all efforts to find 
Usama bin Ladin and his senior lieutenants and to kill them.”61 Within days of its 
arrival, the NALT established contact with senior Northern Alliance members, 
offering money and supplies in exchange for the alliance’s help in attacking the 
Taliban. The team also began to create a joint intelligence cell with the Northern 
Alliance. “All the intelligence that (Northern Alliance) forces collected over the 
coming days…could therefore be funneled into a single office, where it would be 
                                                        
58 Ibid., 171 
59 Ibid., 179 
60 Ibid., 187 
61 Gary C. Shroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War 
on Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, 2007), 40 
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collected, analyzed, and shared with the CIA.”62 With this joint intelligence cell, the 
CIA was able to collect Taliban radio transmissions and troop movement 
observations from its Northern Alliance allies. In addition, the NALT also received 
daily reports from Taliban inside sources — generally either Taliban soldiers 
recruited by the Northern Alliance or civilians living within Northern Alliance 
lines.63 Such intelligence allowed NALT to analyze and predict Taliban activities and 
forward this information back to CIA headquarters, which would then share the 
necessary information with Bush and his War Cabinet. Over the next month, the 
collected information allowed NALT to produce more than four hundred intelligence 
reports, which “allowed U.S. military aircraft to strike Taliban and al-Qa’ida 
positions with great accuracy and a minimum of collateral damage.”64  
Thus, the CIA showed that — like it did during the Cold War — the agency 
could mobilize quickly when given a clearly defined mission. In the months after 
9/11, the mission clearly involved destroying al-Qaeda and capturing bin Laden. 
Despite this opportunity to make itself relevant once more, the agency found itself 
sidetracked with criticisms for its failure to predict (and prevent) the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks as well as its ongoing failure to adapt to a non-state threat. Fighting 
international terrorism required a different operation procedure than fighting the 
Soviet Union, a fact that became more evident as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
dragged on while al-Qaeda remained elusive. 
The Failure of Intelligence 
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 Because the attacks on 9/11 had taken the U.S. government completely by 
surprise, Bush along with Congress created the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States.65 In investigating why the U.S. government missed 
the attacks, the 9/11 Commission highlighted a variety of problems in the 
intelligence community, significantly the “structural barriers to performing joint 
intelligence work.”66 Since the various organizations within the intelligence 
community are organized around gathering information rather than the joint 
mission, the 9/11 Commission said it was impossible for any one organization to 
“connect the dots.”67  
For instance, in January 2000, the CIA had learned that Khalid al Mihdhar (a 
suspected al-Qaeda member who would become one of the nineteen hijackers) 
possessed a U.S. visa. Two months later, the CIA also learned that a second al-Qaeda 
member (and future 9/11 terrorist), Nawaf al Hazmi, also had a U.S. visa and had 
flown to Los Angeles in January. The agency failed to pass any of this information to 
the FBI, however.68 Thus, in August 2001, the FBI failed to “recognize the 
significance of the information regarding Mihdhar and Hazmi’s possible arrival in 
the United States” and did not “share information, assign resources, and give 
sufficient priority to the search.”69 After 9/11, senior FBI officials said that had the 
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CIA shared such information, the Bureau could have connected Mihdhar and Hazmi 
to the other hijackers and the attacks, perhaps, could have been prevented.70 
The Commission’s report did not only fault the CIA for missing 9/11. In fact, 
the report highlighted failures in all parts of the intelligence community and even 
the entire U.S. government. In response to the Commission’s findings, Bush signed 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) in 2004 to better 
centralize intelligence analysis.71 Essentially, the Intelligence Reform Act created a 
new position — Director of National Intelligence (DNI) — charged with overseeing 
“all U.S. intelligence agencies and reporting directly to the president — a major 
reorganization that affected the role and authority of the CIA.”72 Previously, the CIA 
director also had the burden of managing all fifteen agencies within the intelligence 
community. With the 2004 IRTPA, however, the CIA director now focused solely on 
the agency while another office managed the intelligence community as a whole.73 
Thus, the CIA director could better concentrate on the agency’s mission and 
operations. In addition, the reform act created a national counterterrorism center 
(as part of the Executive Office of the President) “to coordinate information sharing 
among intelligence agencies.”74 
Why Change is Necessary 
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 Since Bush signed the IRTPA six years ago, why is change still necessary? 
Although the act did put the CIA (and the rest of the intelligence community) on the 
path to reform, the legislation was by no means comprehensive enough to revitalize 
the CIA. For instance, as mentioned previously, the act created a new office with the 
DNI in order to free the CIA director to focus on agency responsibilities (see figures 
3.1 and 3.2 for a comparison of the intelligence community pre- and post- IRTPA). 
The DNI, thus, would be responsible for coordinating interagency activities. Critics 
of the act, however, suggest that creating a new office does “little more than add 
another layer of bureaucracy to the nation’s intelligence community.”75  
Furthermore, the act requires the DNI to provide the president and Congress 
with quality intelligence analysis but does not demand the same responsibility from 
the CIA director. In fact, the DNI — although compelled to provide such quality 
analysis — does not have the authority over the CIA to hold the agency to a higher 
standard.76 In this way, the act did not substantively reform the agency itself but 
rather only the broad framework of the entire intelligence community. Even those 
reforms were mediocre at best since the reform act excluded the Pentagon (and all 
of its military intelligence divisions) from its control, which resulting in a large 
portion of the intelligence community — the military — experiencing very little  
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FIGURE 3.1 The Intelligence Community Before the 2004 Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act
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FIGURE 3.2 The Intelligence Community After the 2004 Intelligence Reform and 
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reform under the act. Thus, “The net effect of the 2004 reforms may therefore be to 
create an intelligence director with less power than the old one, and to turn the CIA 
into a mostly-espionage agency with only residual intelligence analytical 
capability.”79 Thus, while the U.S. intelligence has made some measure of reform, 
this reform only affected the bureaucratic structure of the community — not the 
CIA’s core mission and its methods in fighting Islamic terrorism. 
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Recommendations 
Now that I have given an overview of the CIA’s history and discussed why 
change is needed, I will devote the fourth section to my suggestions for reform. I 
have divided my plan into two parts — improving human intelligence and 
improving analytical capabilities. With the former, I will offer a plan to enable to 
agency to effectively collect intelligence on al-Qaeda members and other Islamic 
terrorists on the ground. With the latter section, I will discuss how the CIA officers 
back in Langley can better analyze and interpret such intelligence in order to 
provide policymakers with a full picture when the U.S. government develops its 
foreign policy in relation to the war on terror. Taken together, my two-part reform 
plan gives the CIA not only the opportunity to become relevant once more but to 
effectively protect the United States from al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist 
organizations. 
Part I: Improving Collection through Human intelligence 
 As I mentioned in Section II, the agency has lacked a depth in its human 
intelligence for the better part of its history — an intelligence gap the agency often 
tried to fill with signals intelligence instead. While accurate signals intelligence is 
critical, such information only provides policymakers with qualitative data, such as 
missile capabilities and troop movements. Such information can be critical, 
particularly during wartime or in the buildup to war. Through human intelligence, 
however, the agency can reach even deeper into the opponent’s plans. Good human 
intelligence can give the CIA information on the treat’s plans in the earliest stages. 
For example, in the case of terrorism, human intelligence allows the U.S. 
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government to discover the security weakness that al-Qaeda (or any other terrorist 
organization) plans to exploit. Furthermore, such intelligence can give the U.S. 
government the opportunity to capture such terrorists and foil an attempted attack. 
Signals intelligence — in regards to terrorist attacks — can often only reveal a plan 
in its final stages, perhaps in a movement of explosives from a safe house to the 
target. Also, through analysis and the Western media, terrorists have learned how to 
counter U.S. eavesdropping.80 Thus, the agency must begin placing a heavier 
emphasis on human intelligence. 
 The agency’s record on human intelligence is mediocre at best. In all fairness, 
the agency did obtain critical information from defecting KGB officers during the 
Cold War. However, the CIA has yet to cultivate the human intelligence capabilities 
necessary to become an effective, relevant organization. In my plan for reform, I 
offer four measures the CIA must adopt to improve its human intelligence, which I 
will then discuss in greater detail: 
1. Improve the language and regional expertise of case officers 
2. Change the methods of case officer advancement 
3. Stop using failed Cold War techniques 
4. Develop a recruiting and collection strategy based on the realities on the 
ground. 
Improving language and expertise. The agency currently relies heavily on foreign 
liaison services (its counterparts in other nations) to provide intelligence from the 
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field, particularly in the Middle East.81 Why? The agency simply lacks the foreign 
language skills within its own officer base.82 CIA case officers (agency employees 
stationed abroad and charged with recruiting locals to work as double agents) 
frequently serve brief tours of duty, often no more than two years at a time.83 Once 
the case officer finishes his or her tour, that officer is either transferred to a 
different region or returns to the agency headquarters at Langley, Virginia. As a 
result, CIA officers have “simply too little time to know the ins and outs of politics, 
society and culture, and language as well as the ‘who’s who’ in the power 
structure.”84 Essentially, CIA officers rarely have the opportunity to develop regional 
expertise. As a result, the CIA continues to lack a cadre of employees who can fully 
understand the intricacies of Islamic and tribal culture in Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi 
Arabia and other sources of al-Qaeda recruits. 
 In its defense, the CIA claims that by allowing officers to serve extended tours 
of duty, the agency risks losing some officers to “clientitus” — indentifying less with 
U.S. national interests and more so with the national interests of the assigned 
country.85 Although, hypothetically, such a risk exists, the CIA risks even more by 
not developing a corps of  experts on the Middle East and Islamic terrorism. Without 
the regional expertise as well as the language skills, the CIA cannot fully and 
accurately interpret the intelligence it receives on al-Qaeda and other Islamic 
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terrorist organizations. Moreover, the agency’s case officers, if serving short tours, 
will not be able to develop the network at the ground critical to rooting out Islamic 
terrorists in that area. While the CIA risks losing some officers, such a risk will 
always exist, regardless of how long an officer spends abroad. By not developing 
more regional and linguistic experts, the CIA risks even more — failing to follow its 
core mission. 
Changing case officer advancement. The current path to advancement for case 
officers sets the stage for poor intelligence. Basically, case officers are currently 
promoted based on the number of agents they recruit, regardless of whether or not 
the intelligence such agents provide is of any use to the CIA.86 As a result, “the case 
officer who recruits several spies who produce third-rate intelligence…stands a 
better chance of getting promoted than the case officer who recruits one spy whose 
intelligence is extremely relevant and insightful.”87 I propose that the number of 
recruits should be disregarded entirely when considering which case officer to 
promote. Instead, what should be considered is: the quality of the intelligence the 
officer collects (including relevance and timeliness), the officer’s management and 
leadership ability within the officer corps, and the officer’s understanding (including 
language skills) of his or her assigned region. In this way, case officers would focus 
more on the quality of recruits rather than the quantity. This would also give CIA 
employees more incentive to develop a regional expertise.  
 The agency must not also highlight case officers who have performed well. It 
must also evaluate those employees that fall short. “Ignoring lackluster achievement 
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deprives the U.S. government of return on investment, lulls an employee into 
thinking he or she can get by without full effort, and risks alienating officers who do 
work to their fullest capacity.”88 Thus, the agency should identify such poor-
performing employees and either reassign those employees to positions for which 
they are better suited or provide retraining before sending those employees back 
into the field. In this way, the agency allows each employee to play to his or her 
strengths without rewarding substandard behavior. 
Ending failed Cold War methods. Throughout the Cold War, the CIA relied on a 
specific strategy in recruiting potential KGB spies (see Figure 4.1 for an illustration 
of the strategy, which continues to be in effect). With this strategy, CIA officers 
would “spot” a potential spy, generally at a diplomatic function. The CIA officer 
would then “assess” the recruit, determining whether he or she had access to the 
Soviet intelligence the agency needed. The case officer would then “recruit” the spy 
and “develop” him or her, setting up frequent meetings in order for the spy to pass 
information. Finally, when the case officer finished his or her tour of duty, the officer 
would “turnover” the spies to the incoming CIA replacement.  
Although the CIA continued to use this strategy over throughout the Cold 
War, Soviet intelligence officials said the strategy discouraged potential recruits. 
Indeed, they said the CIA would have done well to simply pass contact information 
to the potential spy and avoid frequent face-to-face interactions because “the 
procedures for nurturing a personal relationship with Soviets who potentially could 
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Developing a new recruiting and collection strategy. In place of the discarded Cold 
War recruiting strategy, the CIA needs to develop a strategy that can safely obtain 
the best intelligence within terrorist organizations. First, the agency must give up 
the idea of developing personal relationships with recruits since such a method, as 
mentioned previously, only compromises potential recruits. Also, the agency needs 
to allow for more defections rather than focusing only on sending such sources back 
into the field for more information. An comprised al-Qaeda member, if discovered 
by other terrorist members, would likely be executed (and likely forced to divulge 
information on any CIA officers he or she encountered before being put to death). 
“Although defections offer a one-time snapshot of clandestine activities,” the CIA 
stands the chance of getting information from terrorist with highly-sensitive 
intelligence if that recruit knew he would be safely removed from the area and 
relocated.92 
 Of course, the possibility exists that the intelligence may be incorrect and 
that the potential recruit is only using the agency to be transported to the United 
States (where he can then carry out a possible attack). Also, the supposed defector 
might simply be trying to ascertain CIA capabilities, such as the identities of the CIA 
officers in that area. For this reason, the agency needs to develop a vetting system 
for defectors. First, if possible, the potential defector should be kept separate from 
the CIA officer conducting the interview. The CIA officer would remain behind a one-
way glass window in order to protect his or her identity.93 If resources are scarce, a 
more crude method could be developed that would hide the officer’s identity. 
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Second, the agency needs to develop a broad-base of information sources, not only 
relying on defectors or only double agents, but rather a combination of these two 
sources as well as information from foreign liaison sources. In this way, the agency 
can develop “a strong empirical base on which to compare and contrast information 
to gauge ground truth.”94  
 The agency must also develop a better recruiting strategy at home, focusing 
on two goals: making better use of nonofficial cover officers (NOCs) and adjusting 
security investigations. In regards to the former, the CIA must take advantage of the 
opportunities provided by NOCs — those undercover CIA employees who have no 
connections to the U.S. government infrastructure.95 Without obvious ties to the U.S. 
government (most case officers today work under official cover, generally in 
embassies as a general consulate employee), the sources can “melt into areas rich in 
hard-target (human intelligence) collection opportunities such as the Muslim 
expatriate communities in Europe that are hotbeds for al-Qaeda recruitment, 
indoctrination, and logistics.”96 In addition, NOCs are often people with along 
working history in the private sector. Thus, they have developed their own contacts 
abroad, establishing themselves as American businesspeople and scientists.97 “The 
money that many business dealings entail, moreover, ensures access to real power 
and authorities in foreign governments and societies, access to which government-
salaried Americans rarely even hear about.”98 The agency, however, has been slow 
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to develop this program, continuing to rely on career bureaucrats to serve as 
undercover officers.  
 In regards to security clearances, the agency continues to follow background 
investigation methods that exclude many potential employees — including those 
with critical language skills in Arabic or Farsi. Job applicants who are naturalized 
citizens, have family abroad or have spent extensive time abroad are generally 
unable to receive the security clearance necessary to work at the CIA. Arab 
Americans, for example, are frequently disqualified during the security investigation 
due to their family and friend connections in the Middle East. The agency fears that 
such employees would be vulnerable to foreign pressure.99  
By taking such extreme precautions, the CIA continues to lack the ethnic, 
cultural and linguistic diversity it desperately needs within its officer corps. As 
mentioned previously, the CIA lacks language and regional expertise within its 
agency because it keeps officers’ tours of duty short. By excluding Americans with 
connections to the Middle East, the CIA further weakens its ability to collect human 
intelligence on al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist organizations. Furthermore, 
“many of the people U.S. intelligence needs to hire for highly classified positions will 
necessarily have extensive foreign experience and foreign contacts.”100 Those most 
qualified for these positions should have experience with foreign travel and 
languages. I recommend that the CIA develop a tiered security clearance. On the one 
hand, officers who would have access to top-secret information at Langley would 
continue to receive heavy scrutiny. These officers’ foreign connections would be as 
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heavily investigated as they are today. On the other hand, those officers who would 
be on the ground collecting intelligence on al-Qaeda would continue to be vetted but 
with the knowledge that such officers would not have access to U.S. nuclear secrets, 
advanced signals intelligence, or operations in other areas.101 These officers — with 
their Middle East regional experience — could better connect with information 
sources and provide the agency with critical intelligence without compromising 
agency secrets.  
I have mentioned this point throughout this thesis and will emphasize the 
point again — the Soviet threat is very different from the Islamic terrorism threat 
and requires a different operating procedure. Since al-Qaeda and other terrorist 
organizations are connected to individuals and not necessarily a government, 
ordinary citizens — rather than high-ranking government or military leaders — can 
have access to extremely critical intelligence, such as where a terrorist leader might 
be spending the night. A CIA officer with relations in the Middle East might be 
susceptible to foreign pressure but that same officer can also obtain information 
that an American officer (undercover at the U.S. embassy) could never access. Such 
an officer “could more readily strike up a personal rapport…and understand the 
cultural, tribal, and family ties that often lie at the heart of the politics in nation-
states, insurgencies, and terrorists groups in the Middle East.”102 
Part II: Improving Analysis 
In addition to improving human intelligence, the agency critically needs 
reform in a second area — analysis. While case officers collect intelligence on the 
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ground, it is the analysts back at Langley who have the responsibility of interpreting 
such intelligence and providing policymakers with the information needed to 
develop U.S. foreign policy. Along with collecting intelligence, analysis is one of the 
agency’s most important duties. If the CIA cannot sift through and understand the 
incoming data, then the agency is only partially effective, acting as a storehouse for 
information rather than a conduit through which policymakers can make informed 
decisions for the nation’s security. In my plan for reform, I offer four measures the 
CIA must adopt to improve its analytical capabilities, which I will then discuss in 
greater detail: 
1. Move focus from traditional to transnational targets  
2. Improve regional and analytical expertise 
3. Develop analyst-policymaker relationships 
4. Develop analyst-collector relationships 
Moving focus to transnational targets. During the Cold War, intelligence analysis 
provided estimates in three areas — what exists (for example, how many nuclear 
weapons does the Soviet Union have?), what will be (is the Soviet Union planning on 
invading X nation-state?), and what might be (if the United States does Y, how would 
the Soviet Union react?).103 Essentially, Cold War intelligence analysis involved 
puzzle solving — putting together pieces within a known broad shape. In the war 
against a transnational threat — al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist organizations 
— CIA analysts “are now engaged in a joint and continuing process of trying to 
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understand the terrorist target in the absence of convenient frames of reference.”104 
No longer can the agency rely on a given set of information when interpreting 
incoming intelligence. The Soviet Union was predictable and “discontinuities in its 
behavior were rare. Al-Qaeda has been shown to be patient; however, 
discontinuities in the terrorist threat — new groups or new weapons or new modes 
of attack — are all too possible.”105 
 So, how should the agency analyze incoming intelligence in light of 
transnational rather than traditional war? Basically, intelligence analysis should not 
focus only on the long-term, as it did during the Cold War, but should focus on 
analyzing the long term in combination with answering immediate questions. In 
order to do this, analysts must begin reaching out to a broad array of sources and 
not only the intelligence they receive from case officers stationed on the ground. For 
example, analysts begin viewing their intelligence in context of news reports from 
the same region. As mentioned previously, intelligence on the Soviet Union was 
understood based on what the U.S. government already knew of the communist 
government. In terrorist organizations, different cells throughout the world have 
different goals, even if every cell connects to the same terrorist organization. A CIA 
analyst cannot view a cell based in Syria and a cell based in Pakistan through the 
same lens. An awareness of current events in Syria and Pakistan allows the analyst 
to more accurately estimate possible targets for each cell since events in the two 
nations will affect not only the possible target but the likely profile of a terrorist 
recruit. Not every terrorist will fit the same profile. Understanding the nature of a 
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transnational versus traditional war will help the CIA analyst better appreciate that 
fact. 
 At the same time, however, analysts need to take care not to fall “into the trap 
of trying to become the government’s CNN.”106 In today’s information age and 24-
hours news cycle, the CIA often repeats to policymakers information already shared 
through the media. The CIA should not try to avoid repeating now public 
information but rather use the media to enhance their own intelligence reports by 
targeting “collection assets to collect additional information that rounds out (or 
contradicts) the picture being conveyed by the international media.”107 The liaison 
between the intelligence community and policymakers, thus, can use the media to 
enhance its own intelligence reports rather than repeating information that is 
already public knowledge. 
Improving expertise. As I emphasized in my section on human intelligence, 
improving regional expertise is absolutely critical in reforming and revitalizing the 
agency. As it has with case officers, “the CIA has traditionally done a poor job of 
recruiting, nurturing, and maintaining nationally or internationally recognized 
experts in its analytic ranks.”108 With the agency conducting approximately 90 
percent of the U.S. government’s analysis on foreign affairs as well as serving as 
principal producer of the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB), such lackluster 
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performance is unacceptable.109 Thus, how can the agency better its regional and 
analytical expertise? 
 First, the agency must emphasize deep country knowledge. As I mentioned in 
my section on human intelligence, the agency must adapt its recruiting methods and 
security clearance procedures to reflect the agency’s dire need for Arabic speakers 
and Middle East experts. Within the CIA’s analytical branch, employees might be 
aware of the structure of a Middle East nation’s government but not fully appreciate 
how such a structure works in a practical sense. Rather, “analysts often are 
individuals who have been trained to follow a particular stream of information…but 
have never had deep immersion in the country’s political system, economy, and 
modern history.”110 As a result, analysts fail to predict what foreign leaders worry 
about and what will provoke outrage from the people. 
 For example, in the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan, the U.S. government 
needs the assistance of the government in Pakistan. Taliban fighters and al-Qaeda 
terrorists frequently find refuge from U.S. soldiers by escaping across the border. 
From Pakistan, they can then reorganize and prepare a counter attack. Since the 
assistance of the Pakistani government is so necessary, the U.S. government might 
seek to pressure its counterpart to adopt a specific policy or implement certain 
border control procedures. If and when the government of Pakistan chooses a 
different policy or adopts a different track, CIA analysts need to be able to explain to 
policymakers why this is the case and how the U.S. government could respond. As 
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mentioned previously, the CIA provides approximately 90 percent of the U.S. 
government’s analytical work on foreign affairs. Thus, in the United States’ fight 
against Islamic extremists, the CIA’s analytical assessments are critical in providing 
policymakers with a full picture of the political, economic and social landscape of 
the region. 
 Not only are the agency analysts lacking in regional expertise, they are also 
lacking the academic credentials for analytical work. This is not to say that CIA 
analysts are undereducated (although only a small minority of analysts hold Ph.Ds) 
but rather their positions are viewed as intelligence collection rather than more 
scholarly, detailed analytical work.111 Basically, analysts spend more time 
monitoring classified cable traffic — reports coming in from case officers — instead 
of reading and studying “the publicly available scholarship on the countries or 
topics they are responsible for before assuming their analytic responsibilities on an 
account.”112 As a result, analysts have access to the classified intelligence but lack 
the expertise to analyze such intelligence strategically.  
With such poorly developed analytical capabilities, the CIA has a wide range 
of cable readers and memo writers but few experts on such topics as al-Qaeda and 
other Islamic terrorist organizations. Correcting this requires the agency to not only 
make an effort in hiring more recognized experts but also providing the time, 
resources and attention needed to develop and maintain a regional or topical 
expertise. With the former, the agency should look to efficiently allocating its hiring 
budget to recruiting fewer, quality experts rather than an array of under-qualified 
                                                        
111 Russell, 125 
112 Ibid., 127 
Alotaibi 43
individuals.113 With the latter, the agency must make scholarship a priority. Analysts 
should not only devote their time to monitoring cable traffic but also reading the 
latest work on their country or topic. The CIA should expect its analysts to stay 
abreast of such information just as it expects them to such on top of collected 
intelligence. 
Developing relationships between the analyst and the policymaker. Throughout this 
section, I have alluded to the analyst’s relationship with the policymaker. One thing 
that can be said about this relationship is that it is complex with many elements 
affecting this relationship. Indeed, “the very different ‘cultures’ of intelligence and 
policy” naturally affects not only “the expectations policymakers bring to the table 
regarding intelligence capabilities,” but the analyst’s view of the policy making 
process.114 A policymaker needs to believe the analysts are providing accurate, 
complete information while the analyst needs to feel free from the influence of 
politics and strive “objectivity, civility, thoroughness, and balance.”115 Unfortunately, 
as was seen in the much publicized misinformation in the buildup to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, the analyst-policymaker relationship does not always result in 
accurate intelligence and sound policy decisions.  
 The most critical step the agency should take in improving this relationship 
is by avoiding politicization. Ideally, the analyst’s role is always to inform policy and 
never prescribe policy. This role demands that the CIA remain free from the political 
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temperature of the day and instead provide the intelligence and analysis as it is 
developed. How can the CIA avoid politicization? Essentially, the ways to mitigate 
politicization depend upon the type of politicization used (see figure 4.2). In taking 
steps to mitigate politicization, the agency can produce a more objective set of 
analyses, giving policymakers a more accurate perspective when developing U.S. 
foreign policy. 
FIGURE 4.2 Forms of Politicization116 
 
Developing relationships between the analyst and the collector. Not only must the CIA 
work on improving relations between its analysts and outside policymakers, it also 
                                                        
116 Information from Gregory F. Treverton, “Intelligence Analysis: Between 
“Politicization” and Irrelevance” in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstables and 
Innovation, ed: Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2008), 94 
Note: The text within the “description” and “ways to mitigate” columns are in 
Treverton’s own words. The examples given, however, are my own. 
Type Description Example Ways to Mitigate 
Direct pressure from policy Policy officials intervene 
directly to affect analytic 
conclusion 
Agency is pressure to give 
intelligence saying Iraq 
has WMDs 
Rare but can be subtle — 
logic is to insulate 
intelligence 
House view Analytic office has 
developed strong view 
over time, heresy 
discouraged 
Al-Qaeda is based only in 
Iraq and Afghanistan 
Changed nature of target 
helps, along with need for 
wide variety of methods 
and alternative analyses 
Cherry picking Policy officials see a range 
of assessments and pick 
their favorite 
Egypt is our ally. Our 
allies will not support al-
Qaeda in any way 
Better vetting of courses, 
NIE-like process to 
confront views 
Question asking How the question is 
framed, by intelligence or 
policy, affects the answer 
“How is Saddam Hussein 
aiding al-Qaeda?” 
Closer relations between 
intelligence and policy to 
define question, along 
with contrarian question 
asking by intelligence 
Shared mindset Intelligence and policy 
share strong 
presumptions 
Al-Qaeda has targeted U.S. 
airlines in the past. It will 
continue to target only 
airlines 
Requires new evidence or 
alternative arguments 
Alotaibi 45
needs to work on better developing intra-agency relations, specifically those 
between the analysts and the collectors (the case officers). “When collection fails, 
the probability of analytical failure increases dramatically.”117 Basically, analysts 
cannot create a full and reasonably accurate estimate without all of the facts. 
 On the collection side of this relationship, intelligence failure occurs through 
“intelligence denial” — when the target successfully prevents the case officer and 
his or her source from accessing certain information.118 As a result, the analytical 
side tries to correct for such missing information, often misinterpreting the 
intelligence when turning around and providing what information they do have to 
the policymakers. 
 An easy solution to this problem would be better collection. However, even if 
the agency followed my recommendations for improving human intelligence while 
also improving signals intelligence capabilities, the very nature of the Islamic 
terrorist threat will prevent case officers from obtaining all needed information on 
the terrorist threat. Unfortunately, “the penetrability of the top ranks of terrorist 
groups like al-Qaeda is likely to remain more an aspiration than a reality.”119 For this 
reason, agency analysts need to recognize the limits of intelligence collecting as well 
as the intelligence capabilities the CIA does have access to.120 Furthermore, the 
temptation to overcompensate for lacking intelligence by filling in the gaps must be 
curbed. Instead, the analyst — when studying the intelligence — should determine 
                                                        
117 James B. Bruce, “The Missing Link: The Analyst-Collector Relationship” in 
Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovation, ed.: Roger Z. George and 
James B. Bruce (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 191 
118 Ibid., 191 
119 Ibid., 203 
120 Ibid., 203 
Alotaibi 46
what key information is missing (for example, is a specific target not mentioned?). 
The analyst should also question whether it is possible the target successfully hid in 
information and if so, how such information was denied (for example, does the 
agency lack quality informants or was the information misleading?).121 
Once the analyst recognizes that critical information is missing, the analyst 
should provide a range of alternative analyses to compensate for this denial rather 
than one seemingly plausible answer. Poor intelligence necessitates better 
analytical information. “Analysts must significantly increase their use of alternative 
or structured analysis to generate hypothesis about unlikely but consequential 
events, even — perhaps especially — if they are otherwise hard to imagine.”122 In 
this way, the CIA’s analysis can better reach its full potential. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Given the criticisms of the CIA in recent years, many have raised the question 
of whether or not the U.S. government should simply dissolve the agency altogether, 
assigning its duties to various intelligence agencies within the military or executive 
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branch. Although the agency certainly deserves much of the criticism thrown its 
way, I believe shutting down the organization is not only unwise and would 
seriously threaten the U.S. effort in the fight against Islamic extremists. 
First, many of the recommendations I have presented are, broadly speaking, 
“common sense” solutions — improving language expertise and streamlining 
security procedures, for example. While such proposals do not seem radical, they 
will go a long way in making the CIA relevant and effective in fighting Islamic 
terrorism. Every recommendation I have detailed demands that the CIA discard its 
old way of business from the Cold War and adapt to a post-9/11 world where 
transnational terrorists — and not a communist government — are the true threat 
to U.S. national security.  
In addition, the CIA is the only independent intelligence agency throughout 
the U.S. government structure. The intelligence bureaus within various cabinet 
departments and the agencies within the military are only subsets of a larger 
organization with its own mission. For example, the State Department’s main 
responsibility is acting as the diplomatic arm of the United States. Its main priority 
is not the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence but rather carrying through 
U.S. foreign policy in a more overt manner. The CIA is the only part of the federal 
government devoted solely to such collection and analysis. 
Finally, rather than dissolving the CIA and dividing its responsibilities 
amongst the other agencies, the U.S. government would do well to use the large 
intelligence community to, essentially, divvy up responsibilities. While the CIA 
devotes the bulk of its resources and capabilities to fighting Islamic terrorism, the 
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other agencies could focus on other threats — for example, North Korean nuclear 
proliferation or domestic terrorism. In this way, the intelligence community leaves 
no threat unnoticed. The answer, thus, is not to simply erase the controversial CIA 
but rather re-conceptualize the agency, making it relevant, efficient and effective. 
With the bureaucratic structure already in place, it would be foolish to disband it 
and start from scratch. 
 
